University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2014

The Challenge of Supreme Court Biography: The
Case of Chief Justice Rehnquist
Christopher W. Schmidt

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Schmidt, Christopher W., "The Challenge of Supreme Court Biography: The Case of Chief Justice Rehnquist" (2014). Constitutional
Commentary. 142.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/142

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

7 - THE CHALLENGE OF SUPREME COURT BIOS_SCHMIDT (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 11:04 AM

THE CHALLENGE OF SUPREME COURT
BIOGRAPHY: THE CASE OF CHIEF
JUSTICE REHNQUIST
THE PARTISAN: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM
REHNQUIST. By John A. Jenkins. 1 New York, N.Y.:
PublicAffairs. 2012. Pp. xxi + 330. $28.99 (cloth).
Christopher W. Schmidt 2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Partisan, a new biography of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist by John A. Jenkins, is a bad book. But it is a bad book
that is worth engaging because it provides important information
3
about its unquestionably important subject. It is also worth
engaging because its shortcomings, while pronounced, even
egregious, in fact derive from challenges inherent in the enterprise
of Supreme Court biography.
I pursue three goals in this review. First, I identify what is
useful in The Partisan: information, some new, some helpful
elaborations of what was already known, which helps us better
understand Chief Justice Rehnquist, the private man and the
1. Founder & CEO of Law Street Media and President & Publisher Emeritus of CQ Press.
2. Assistant Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; Faculty Fellow, American Bar
Foundation.
3. THE PARTISAN is the first book-length biography of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
There have been numerous books on the Supreme Court under Rehnquist’s leadership.
See, e.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE
RIGHT (2002); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE
THE REHNQUIST COURT (1995); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005). There have
been books on Rehnquist’s jurisprudence. See, e.g., SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1989); THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006). And
there have been countless law review articles about Rehnquist’s work on the Court. See,
e.g., 58 STAN. L. REV. 1661 (“Symposium: Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The
Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor”). Prior to THE PARTISAN, the
only book-length biographical study of Rehnquist was a celebratory “portrait” written by
one of Rehnquist’s close friends. HERMAN J. OBERMAYER, REHNQUIST: A PERSONAL
PORTRAIT OF THE DISTINGUISHED CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (2009).
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public jurist. Second, I examine what Jenkins is trying to do in this
book and where he runs into problems. The most obvious flaw of
this biography is its relentless tendentiousness. The author clearly
dislikes Rehnquist, and he uses the biography as a vehicle for an
extended, largely unpersuasive, ad hominem attack on his subject.
But Jenkins’ goal is not merely to criticize Rehnquist the jurist. It
is to “unmask” (p. xix) Rehnquist, to conflate his personality and
his judicial views and thereby reveal the core of the man. Jenkins,
predictably, finds what he was looking for: a harsh, uncaring, and
deeply conservative ideologue. But in the process he presents a
version of Rehnquist that not only fails to align with certain
known facts about the man, but also lacks the complex humanity
of a fully drawn biographical subject. Finally, I argue that the
problems that this particular book puts in high relief are in fact
symptomatic of the genre of Supreme Court biography. My
critique thus provides a platform to consider the unique obstacles
faced by any biographer of a Supreme Court Justice.
II. WHAT WE LEARN ABOUT REHNQUIST
A. REHNQUIST AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIOGRAPHY
The life of any public figure might be divided into three
categories. There is the public life. For a Supreme Court Justice
this would include written opinions, public statements,
information about relations with other Justices, and the like.
There is the private life. This would include biographical
information about the Justice’s upbringing and education,
relations with family and friends, activities and interests beyond
the Court. And then there is the personal. This would include
some difficult-to-define combination of personality, character,
and self-identity. For the biographer, it is the reconstruction of
this last, interior layer, what Judge Richard Posner has labeled the
4
“essential self,” that pulls together, and gives meaning to, the
various strands of the subject’s life.
The measure of a great biography is its ability to present a
compelling portrait of the subject, one in which public, private,
and personal align into a singular, comprehensible identity—but
one that is not so reduced that it loses the complexities and texture
of the human being at the center of the study. The explanatory
force of a biography lies in its ability to allow each of the three

4.

Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502, 504 (1995).
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realms of the subject’s life to bring insight to the others. This is
where the unique value of a biographical approach to law is
located: The biographer reshapes our understanding of the
subject’s public life in light of those elements of the subject’s life
that are less well known.
These considerations highlight why Rehnquist is a
particularly difficult subject for the biographer. He insistently,
even belligerently, resisted introspection. Rehnquist was a prolific
author throughout his time on the Court, writing about a wide
5
variety of topics, including the Court’s history and the challenges
6
of judging and constitutional interpretation. At one point he even
drafted a novel about a judge and his clerk that clearly drew on
his own experiences. But he recoiled at the idea of writing directly
about himself. To write an “interesting” memoir, he explained in
2001, “you have to say that ‘this is a good person,’ ‘that’s a bad
person,’ ‘that’s a medium person,’ ‘he really let me down here.’
7
And I just don’t want to do that.” Rehnquist simply did not like
8
talking about himself, friends explained. His autobiographical
opening to his book on the Supreme Court is self-conscious and
9
stilted. He rarely gave interviews, and when he did he generally
avoided saying anything particularly interesting about either
himself or his approach to judging. Judge Posner once described
the “general challenge of judicial biography” as figuring out how
to “write empathetically and arrestingly about dullish people who
10
are not introspective.” Whether or not this is a fair assessment
of the judicial profession, Chief Justice Rehnquist did little to
undermine Judge Posner’s observation.
So perhaps it is not surprising that Jenkins found relatively
little in his research on Rehnquist to reveal any sort of inner,
personal world. This was a man who simply did not seem
interested in exploring this terrain. Or if he did, he was not about
to reveal his findings anywhere that a biographer might find them.
The journals Rehnquist kept as a college and law student were
filled with irreverent commentary about his studies, humorous
sketches, and prosaic details of his travels, but not much revealing
information beyond this (pp. 17, 23). When, later in life, he added
5.
6.

See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT (rev. ed. 2002).
See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 T EX.
L. REV. 693 (1976).
7. Charles Lane, Head of the Class, STAN. MAG. (July/Aug. 2005) (quoting 2001
Charlie Rose interview).
8. Id.
9. REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 3–20.
10. Posner, supra note 4, at 516.
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occasional entries to these journals, they consisted mostly of
quotations from history books and biographies he was reading
(pp. 79–80). Those insights we get into the personal side of
Rehnquist in The Partisan are largely from the outside, and
usually from a distance.
Jenkins is similarly unsuccessful at shedding new light on
11
Rehnquist’s public side. As I discuss in more detail below, when
it comes to legal issues Jenkins is an unreliable, under-informed,
and thoroughly biased guide. There is little of value in his
scattershot and cursory engagement with Rehnquist’s legal
thought and doctrinal contributions.
What contributions there are in The Partisan, then, consist
largely of Jenkins’ exploration into two areas of Rehnquist’s life
story that fall within the aforementioned category of the
“private.” Jenkins offers much information about Rehnquist’s
12
work and political activities prior to becoming a Justice. Here we
find a smart, curious, and often irreverent young man dedicated
from his early years to a confident, doctrinaire, libertarianinflected conservatism. It was this combative conservatism that
would attract the attention of the Nixon Administration, setting
in motion his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1972. The
other area of Rehnquist’s life for which Jenkins provides new
insight is his extracurricular activities during his time on the
bench. Although a notably constant man in many ways, there was
a restless quality to Rehnquist’s mind, one that expressed itself in
his constant search for new challenges and diversions. As a justice
he cultivated a variety of outside interests, never allowing the
work of the Court to dominate his life.
B. THE PRE-COURT YEARS
1. Upbringing and Education
Jenkins, like others before him, identifies the roots of
Rehnquist’s conservative political and legal commitments in his
13
family and the community in which he was raised. Born in 1924,
Rehnquist grew up in Shorewood, Wisconsin, a suburb of
Milwaukee on the shores of Lake Michigan. His political leanings
11. See infra Part II.
12. Jenkins dedicates approximately half of this relatively short biography (the text
comes in at just over 250 pages) to Rehnquist’s pre-Court years.
13. See, e.g., George Lardner Jr. & Saundra Saperstein, A Chief Justice-Designate
With Big Ambitions, WASH. POST, July 6, 1986, at A1.
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formed early. He was raised in an anti-New Deal Republican
family in a community that was, even at the height of the New
14
Deal, staunchly Republican. The town was all-white, its
inhabitants accepting of a casual, seemingly unchallenged racial
insensitivity (during his time as a student, Rehnquist’s high school
held a Harlem-themed prom) (p. 3).
The subsequent steps in his life reflected the characteristics
that were coming to define Rehnquist: he was bright and
confident as a student; he was impatient; he could be irreverent;
and he was politically conservative. Rehnquist received a
scholarship to Kenyon College in Ohio. After a semester at
Kenyon, he enlisted in the Army. Toward the end of the war, he
shipped out to North Africa, where he served as a weather
observer for the Army Air Corps. After his return to the United
States in early 1946, Rehnquist attended Stanford University,
supported by the G.I. Bill and various part-time jobs (p. 13). He
graduated in just two years with both bachelor’s and master’s
degrees in political science. After a brief, disappointing stint as a
graduate student in the Government Department at Harvard, he
abandoned his thoughts of becoming an academic and returned to
Stanford for law school. Jenkins brings together scattered
evidence of the sharpening conservative commitments of the
young Rehnquist: while serving in North Africa, Rehnquist was
impressed by Friedrich von Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, the
15
recently published free-market manifesto (p. 14); his Stanford
master’s thesis articulated a narrow, libertarian-styled vision of
16
individual rights (p. 22); his disillusionment with Harvard
stemmed at least partly from his professors’ liberal leanings (pp.
24–25). During his time at Stanford Law School, he was, according
to one profile, “widely regarded as both outlandishly conservative
17
and outlandishly bright.” At Stanford, Rehnquist was editor-inchief of the Law Review and graduated a semester early (p. 26).
2. Supreme Court Clerkship
While we have only scattered writings and recollections to
reconstruct Rehnquist’s nascent political and legal attitudes up to
14. Id.
15. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
16. William Hibbs Rehnquist, Contemporary Theories of Rights, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1997 (2006) (reprint of Rehnquist’s 1948 master’s thesis). For a laudatory analysis of
Rehnquist’s thesis, see Douglas W. Kmiec, Young Mr. Rehnquist’s Theory of Moral
Rights—Mostly Observed, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1827 (2006).
17. Lane, supra note 7.
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this point, the paper trail becomes far more revealing during the
next stage of Rehnquist’s life, when he clerked for U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson. Rehnquist’s memorandums for
Justice Jackson, which came to public attention during his
18
confirmation hearings to the Supreme Court in 1971, have been
19
thoroughly examined by scholars. The most famous was one in
which the clerk confidently weighed in on the merits of the
pending Brown v. Board of Education. Titled “A Random
Thought on the Segregation Cases,” Rehnquist urged the Court
not to involve itself in the school segregation issue, a position he
located within a broader skepticism toward the judicial defense of
individual rights against state regulation. “[I]t was not part of the
judicial function to thwart public opinion except in extreme
20
cases,” he wrote. State racial segregation policy “quite clearly is
not one of those extreme cases which commands
21
intervention . . . .” He concluded: “I realize that it is an
unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have been
excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagyes [sic], but I think Plessy v.
Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed.” 22
Rehnquist further elaborated on his views in memos
23
involving a case of racial exclusion from party primaries. Again,
he portrayed himself as a voice of reason—“a lawyer, rather than
a crusader”—standing up against a crowd of liberals engaged in a
18. See, e.g., John P. MacKenzie, Controversy Deepens over Rehnquist Memo, WASH.
POST, Dec. 10, 1971, at A1.
19. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 304-09 (2004); RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 604-09 (1976); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH
OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at
696-703 (2006); Saul Brenner, The Memos of Supreme Court Law Clerk William Rehnquist:
Conservative Tracts, or Mirrors of His Justice’s Mind?, 76 JUDICATURE 77 (1993); Laura
K. Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert
Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 553-59 (1996); Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Jackson and the Brown Case, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 245–47; Brad Snyder & John
Q. Barrett, Rehnquist’s Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk’s 1955 Thoughts on Justice
Jackson and Brown, 53 B.C. L. REV. 631 (2012); Brad Snyder, What Would Justice Holmes
Do (WWJHD)?: Rehnquist’s Plessy Memo, Majoritarianism, and Parents Involved, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 873, 873–76 (2008).
20. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Justice Robert H. Jackson, “A
Random Thought on the Segregation Cases” (undated), Robert Houghwout Jackson
Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [hereinafter Jackson Papers], Box 184,
Folder 5, reprinted in Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 314 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Nomination
Hearings].
21. Id.
22. Id. at 315.
23. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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“pathological search for discrimination.” 24 His reasoning here
moved beyond the posture of the neutral, post-Lochner
constitutional lawyer dedicated to judicial deference except in
“extreme” cases. He adopted a more substantive—and frankly
conservative—vision of race relations:
It is about time the Court faced the fact that the white people
on [sic] the South don’t like the colored people; the
Constitution restrains them from effecting this dislike through
state action, but it most assuredly did not appoint the Court as
a sociological watchdog to rear up every time private
discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head.

He emphasized the costs civil rights imposed on other
constitutional values, namely “freedom of association” and
25
“majority rule.”
Jenkins follows in the long line of scholars who have
concluded that Rehnquist’s later attempts to disown the contents
of these writings were disingenuous: at the time he wrote the
memos, Rehnquist clearly subscribed to the positions he outlined.
26
The evidence is simply overwhelming. Jenkins supplements the
language from Rehnquist’s memos with a letter Rehnquist wrote
to Justice Frankfurter soon after Jackson’s death in October 1954,
in which he expressed his disappointment with Jackson—a
disappointment likely connected to Jackson’s refusal to follow
27
Rehnquist’s advice on the civil rights cases. Jenkins also
references Rehnquist’s admission during his 1984 interview with
the Justice that, with regard to Brown, “there was a perfectly
28
reasonable argument the other way” (p. 43).
3. Phoenix
Jenkins provides some helpful information about the next
stage of Rehnquist’s life as well. In the summer of 1953, Rehnquist
left Washington, D.C., for Phoenix (chosen for the weather, he
often explained) to practice law. He married Natalie “Nan”
24. Cert. memo from William Rehnquist to Justice Robert Jackson on Terry v.
Adams (undated), Jackson Papers, Box 179, Folder 9, reprinted in 1986 Nomination
Hearings, supra note 20, at 312.
25. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Regarding the Opinions of Justices
Black and Frankfurter in Terry v. Adams, Jackson Papers, Box 179, Folder 9, reprinted in
1986 Nomination Hearings, supra note 20, at 313.
26. See texts cited, supra note 19.
27. See Snyder & Barrett, supra note 19.
28. John A. Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk with Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Mar. 3, 1985, at 28, 30.
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Cornell, whom he had met while in law school, and settled into
law practice and family life. He and Nan raised a son and two
daughters. He ventured into political activity, mostly on the local
level.
As extensively documented in the record collected years later
for his 1971 nomination to the Supreme Court, Rehnquist’s
speeches and activities during this period were starkly and
aggressively conservative and libertarian. He attacked the
Supreme Court for its liberal leanings, which he blamed in part on
29
the influence of liberal law clerks. And he stood opposed to civil
rights reform—a position that, along with his memorandum on
Brown, would become a focal point in his confirmation hearings.
We see in these statements a further elaboration of
Rehnquist the sociologist of race, stepping outside the legalist
shield of deference to majoritarian outcomes and formal
procedures to offer his own, quite pessimistic account of the
nature of race relations in America. In 1964, Rehnquist publicly
opposed a Phoenix ordinance that would prohibit restaurants and
other public accommodations from discriminating based on race,
declaring it an affront to private property rights. Rehnquist’s
libertarian commitments were well on display in his testimony
before the city council when he declared that people came to
Arizona because of their commitment to “[f]ree enterprise, and
by that I mean not just free enterprise in the sense of the right to
make a buck but the right to manage your own affairs as free as
30
possible from the interference of government.” Rehnquist also
grounded his opposition to civil rights policy on a skepticism
toward the capacity of law to uproot the deeply entrenched racial
prejudice he saw coursing through social relations. As he wrote in
a letter to his local newspaper, civil rights law is “[u]nable to
correct the source of the indignity to the Negro,” which was “the
state of mind of the proprietor who refuses to treat each potential
31
customer on his own merits.”
He applied similar libertarian reasoning to school
desegregation policy. In a letter to the editor of the Arizona
29. See also William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74.
30. Comments of William Rehnquist, Made June 15, 1964, at the Public Hearing on
the Public Accommodations Ordinance Proposed for the City of Phoenix, reprinted in
Nominations of Justice William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 305 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Nomination Hearings].
31. William H. Rehnquist, Public Accommodations Law Passage is Called “Mistake,”
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, reprinted in 1971 Nomination Hearings, supra note 30, at 307.
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Republic, written in the midst of a 1967 debate over a school
desegregation plan, Rehnquist challenged the Phoenix school
superintendent for declaring “achieving an integrated society” his
32
guiding goal in framing school assignment policy. “[W]e are no
more dedicated to an ‘integrated’ society than we are to a
‘segregated’ society,” Rehnquist wrote; “we are instead dedicated
to a free society, in which each man is equal before the law, but in
which each man is accorded a maximum amount of freedom of
33
choice in his individual activities.”
During his pre-Court years, Rehnquist staked out political
and legal positions on the far right end of the ideological
spectrum. By the late 1960s, his positions on race were being
pushed beyond the pale of politically acceptable opinion. This fact
would almost derail his appointment to the Supreme Court.
4. In the Nixon Administration
Rehnquist’s legal and political activities brought with them
connections that would eventually return him to Washington.
When Barry Goldwater, the United States Senator from Arizona,
ran for President in 1964, Rehnquist served as a speechwriter and
34
advisor (pp. 73–74). Rehnquist became close to Richard
Kleindienst, a lawyer with extensive connections in Arizona
Republican politics who was appointed deputy attorney general in
the Nixon Administration. He, in turn, got Rehnquist appointed to
run the Office of Legal Counsel (p. 77). In early 1969, the fortyfour-year-old Rehnquist was back in the nation’s capital.
Rehnquist spoke out, in public and behind closed doors,
aggressively advancing his political and legal commitments—
which aligned well with the right wing of the Nixon
Administration. He was a law-and-order advocate through and
through. He warned of the “barbarians of the new left,” who
“constitute[] a threat to the notion of government of law which is
every bit as serious as the ‘crime wave’ in our cities” (p. 82). He
set to work on one of Nixon’s central campaign issues, rolling back
the Warren Court’s expansion of criminal rights. He prepared a
lengthy critique of the Warren Court decisions in the area of
32. William H. Rehnquist, ‘De Facto’ Schools Seen Serving Well, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1967, reprinted in 1971 Nomination Hearings, supra note 30, at 309.
33. Id.
34. See also RICK P ERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY G OLDWATER AND
THE UNMAKING OF THE A MERICAN CONSENSUS 424-25, 461-62 (2001); T USHNET,
supra note 3, at 23-24.
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criminal justice in which he suggested that rectifying the damage
the Court had wrought might require a constitutional amendment
and proposed a presidential commission to consider the
possibility. A particular target of his attack on the Warren Court
35
was Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court required police to
inform suspects, prior to questioning, about their right to remain
silent and to counsel.
With the retirements of Justices Black and Harlan in 1971,
two new Court openings materialized. One went to Lewis Powell.
The other, after some debate within the Nixon Administration,
went to Rehnquist. Nixon and his advisors saw Rehnquist as an
impressively credentialed lawyer who would please conservative
elements in the Republican Party. A relative unknown on the
national legal scene, his confirmation hearings were largely
uneventful. Controversy arose, however, in the period after the
hearings had concluded but before his confirmation vote in the
Senate. This was when Newsweek broke the story of Rehnquist’s
36
Brown memorandum. Rehnquist’s disingenuous explanation
that the memos were an effort to capture Justice Jackson’s views,
not his own, quelled the potential controversy, and the Senate
approved his nomination with a vote of 70 to 22. On January 7,
1972, at age forty-seven, Rehnquist took his seat on the Court.
C. THE COURT YEARS
At this point, with Rehnquist an Associate Justice on the
Supreme Court, Jenkins’ biography moves back and forth
between Rehnquist’s public life as a Justice and his off-the-Court
interests and activities. The material on his Court work is thin.
What Jenkins lacks in new insights he fills with a padding of blunt
and unceasing criticism of Rehnquist’s jurisprudence.
Jenkins does provide some interesting material, however,
about Rehnquist’s private life during his Court years. The most
powerful revelation to emerge from the biography was the extent
to which Rehnquist chafed against the isolation he felt upon
landing at the apex of the American legal system. Practically from
the moment he arrived he was looking for opportunities to shake
up the staid, formal routines of the Court. Early in his tenure, he
offered Chief Justice Burger proposals for enlivening the work of
the Justices (introducing a coffee hour following oral arguments,
redecorating the dining room, having the clerks put on a satirical
35.
36.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Supreme Court: Memo from Rehnquist, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1971, at 32.

7 - THE CHALLENGE OF SUPREME COURT BIOS_SCHMIDT (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

BOOK REVIEWS

4/2/2014 11:04 AM

281

skit), which Burger promptly shot down (p. 170). Intensely
competitive, Rehnquist was always trying to set up wagers with
his colleagues on matters big and small (pp. 171, 197–201). He
enjoyed playing jokes, some quite elaborate, on his colleagues
(pp. 171–75). And there were of course those four gold stripes on
his black robe, which appeared in 1995, inspired by the character
of the Lord Chancellor in a production of Gilbert and Sullivan’s
37
Iolanthe (p. 253).
One fascinating point that comes out quite clearly in this
behind-the-scenes portrait of Rehnquist was the connection he
formed with his very senior colleague, William O. Douglas. It
would be hard to find two Justices who on the surface had less in
common. Douglas was the New Deal firebrand, the visionary civil
libertarian, the discoverer of the constitutional right to privacy in
the penumbras and emanations of the Bill of Rights. Rehnquist
opposed all of this. Their personal lives were also far, far apart.
Douglas was the womanizer who married four times, each new
wife younger than the last. Rehnquist, by all indications, was
deeply dedicated to Nan until her death in 1991. Douglas was
notoriously harsh to his clerks, and he had prickly relations with
his colleagues. Rehnquist was generally beloved by clerks and
colleagues. Yet the two men, who were on the Court together
from 1972 until Douglas’ retirement in 1975, shared a roving,
iconoclastic intellectual brilliance. Rehnquist admired Douglas,
singling him out for his ability to “[n]ot be[] bamboozled by
currents, trendy ideas” (p. 151). Douglas respected his younger
colleague’s intelligence and he urged Rehnquist to cultivate his
life outside the Court. The ideological odd couple shared time
with their wives at Douglas’ summer cabin (pp. 152–53).
Rehnquist followed Douglas’ advice and went searching for
outside activities—for ways, as Rehnquist put it, to “get away
from the monasticism” of the Court (p. 154). “You just have to
keep anchors to the outside world,” Rehnquist explained,
“because a justice of this Court could do all of the work he has
to do in discharge of his oath of office without ever leaving this
building. . . . [I]t’s a two-dimensional world if you let that happen
to you” (p. 154). He accepted invitations to give speeches and
talk to law school classes. He took painting classes, read
37. According to Justice Stevens, following an international trip in which the Chief
Justice saw justices from various countries wearing different colored robes, Rehnquist
suggested to his colleagues a change from their traditional black. There were no takers,
but Rehnquist went ahead on his own. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME
COURT MEMOIR 173 (2011).
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voraciously, and played poker with friends. And he tried his
hand at writing fiction.
Jenkins dedicates a chapter to Rehnquist’s failed efforts to
become a novelist. Rehnquist spent the summer of 1974 writing a
draft of a short novel, a legal drama centered around a federal
judge and his clerk. Was the novel any good? Jenkins thinks not.
“[T]he writing was amateurish, the plot anything but compelling,”
he declares (p. 181). None of the editors who looked at the
manuscript felt it publishable without a thorough and
fundamental reworking (pp. 181–85), so Jenkins’ uncharitable
assessment appears not far from the mark. Rehnquist, who
described himself as “a complete neophyte when it comes to
technique” (p. 181), was an eager student initially. But when yet
another editor gave Rehnquist detailed editing suggestions,
making clear the “major effort” that would be required to make
the novel publishable, Rehnquist became frustrated (p. 184). He
took a couple more stabs at revising the manuscript in subsequent
summers, but he never was able to see the project through. He
lamented to his agent that “somehow the creative urge which
moved me several summers ago . . . has simply not returned” (p.
185). He never gave up his goal to become a novelist, though,
quietly working on other fiction writing projects. The 1990s found
him working on a murder mystery and musing about possibly
writing historical fiction about Custer’s Last Stand (pp. 185–87).
D. REHNQUIST ASSESSED
What does all this tell us about Rehnquist? Two points are
worth highlighting. First, Rehnquist formed strikingly clear
ideological commitments early in life. Although he adapted
these commitments to new circumstances, his basic beliefs
changed little over the course of his pre-Court life. These views,
typical for 1930s Shorewood, Wisconsin, sometimes made for an
awkward fit during subsequent stages of his life. He felt
alienated as a graduate student at Harvard, in part because of his
political views; as a clerk at the Supreme Court he saw himself
surrounded by left-leaning fellow clerks. The confident young
lawyer adopted an embattled sensibility, which allowed him to
only strengthen his conservative and libertarian commitments in
the following decades, when they seemed increasingly out of step
with much of the nation.
Second, Rehnquist, a man of steady temperament and habits
in so much of his life, was deeply restless when it came to
occupying his interests. He was constantly searching for new
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activities and challenges, for new ways to change up stale routines.
His impatience was evident in both his professional and private
lives. He made decisions quickly. Never one to agonize, he did not
38
second-guess decisions once made. As he explained in his one
interview with Jenkins (in 1984): “You’ve got to . . . decide one
case and go on to the next one . . . . [T]here’s literally no time for
thinking about past decisions: Was I right or was I wrong? You’d
simply go nuts if you did that” (p. 150). (The contrast with the
notoriously indecisive Justice Harry Blackmun, who served on the
39
Court from 1970 and 1994, could not have been starker. )
Rehnquist wrote quickly. As Chief Justice, he cut advocates off in
mid-sentence at oral arguments when their time had expired.
When the Justices met to discuss recently argued cases, he ran a
tight, efficient conference, more an opportunity to count votes
than a discussion session. He generally arrived at the Court midmorning and left by mid-afternoon. And, remarkable for a line of
work prone to proclamations of self-importance, he enjoyed
deflating the oftentimes over-exuberant rhetoric about the
Court’s role in American society. It is only a “little stream of
history that flows by this Court,” he explained in his interview
with Jenkins. “[M]any other things . . . have a greater influence on
people’s daily lives than what this Court decides” (p. 149).
III. A PARTISAN BIOGRAPHY
In a 1995 article, Judge Posner offered a useful framework
40
for evaluating the genre of judicial biography. The judicial
biographer, he explained, tends to be driven by goals that are
“ideological” and “essentialist”: ideological in that, whether
seeking to debunk or elevate her subject, the biographer evaluates
41
the subject through a comparison to some ideal type; essentialist
in that the biographer seeks to identify within the subject a
42
The Partisan fits
coherent, knowable “essential self.”
comfortably into Judge Posner’s categorization. Indeed, it reads
38. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, How Not to Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of
William H. Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2006) (Rehnquist “did not believe in
second-guessing others or—more importantly—himself. I heard him say in conversation
more than once that he believed a second or third response to a problem tended to be no
more valid than the initial response, and so there was little to be gained by going back to
an issue again and again. He believed in simply getting the job done and moving on.”).
39. See generally LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005).
40. Posner, supra note 4.
41. Id. at 503–04.
42. Id. at 504.
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almost like a caricatured effort to demonstrate what a fully
realized ideological-essentialist judicial biography would look
like. And, as Judge Posner warned, it is deeply problematic.
A. THE IDEOLOGICAL REHNQUIST
One might suspect an ideological agenda on the part of this
particular biographer even before the book is cracked. The title,
after all, is The Partisan. Nothing too wrong there, though.
Rehnquist was an unapologetic conservative throughout his life.
His pre-Court years were marked by aggressive partisan activity.
None other than the thoroughly partisan President Richard Nixon
declared Rehnquist “on our side” (p. 129) and encouraged him to
“be just as mean and rough as they say you were” (p. xiv) when
he chose him for the Court. And there is a strong case to be made
that his judicial decision making was largely an extension of his
pre-Court partisan commitments. So partisanship might not be
the worst of themes for his biography.
We quickly learn, however, that the “partisan” label hardly
captures the Rehnquist that Jenkins wants to offer. “[T]o call
Rehnquist simply a conservative,” Jenkins explains at the start of
the book, “would be to miss the essence of what defined him” (p.
xiv). From here, Jenkins is off and running, his condemnation of
his subject gaining momentum with each sentence:
Rehnquist’s judicial philosophy was nihilistic at its core,
disrespectful of precedent and dismissive of social, economic,
and political institutions that did not comport with his blackand-white view of the world. Rehnquist instinctively knew
whose side he was on when it came to criminals and law
abiders, minorities and the white majority, the poor and the
rich, the powerless and the powerful. He set his plan
accordingly. Infatuated with his own genius, he spoke his mind,
cast his votes, and damned his critics (p. xiv).

B. THE PROBLEM WITH IDEOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY
The biographer’s moves on display here are worth stopping
to consider. Putting aside for the moment Jenkins’ claims about
Rehnquist’s character—his “essence”—the basic critique here is
an ideological one: Rehnquist is conservative, and Jenkins does
not like this. The goal here is to categorize Rehnquist’s political
beliefs in order to marginalize them. The effect is to distance the
reader from the subject by establishing an ideological baseline
(some semi-articulated version of liberalism) and then showing all
the ways the subject fails to meet its requirements. This is a
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political critique (or, in Jenkins’ unsubtle hands, more of a
polemic). It is not biography.
A biographer’s first responsibility is to understand his
subject. This requires some level of imagination and empathy—
two qualities in short supply in this particular biography. “Getting
inside other people’s minds,” writes one historian, “requires that
your own mind be open to their impressions—their hopes and
fears, their beliefs and dreams, their sense of right and wrong,
43
their perception of the world and where they fit within it.” Then,
and only then, there is the opportunity to judge. A biography
written without sympathy for the subject is a critical biography. A
biography written without empathy for the subject is a failure of
the craft of biography.
C. THE ESSENTIAL REHNQUIST
Jenkins’ assessment of Rehnquist goes well beyond a critique
of his conservative political and jurisprudential beliefs, however.
According to Jenkins, Rehnquist’s doctrinaire and far-right brand
of conservatism was more than a failure of political judgment. It
was a failure at a deeper level, a failure at his subject’s core, inner
being—his “essence,” in Judge Posner’s formulation. “Like many
public figures,” Jenkins writes, “Rehnquist presented a face to the
public that often was at odds with the private man. My purpose
here is to unmask that private face” (p. xix). The collegial
Rehnquist was a public “mask of jollity,” behind which was “the
brooding private man” (p. 34). Since the public Rehnquist was
defined by a harshness and a lack of charity, so, according to
Jenkins, must the private Rehnquist be defined by analogously
ominous characteristics.
Critically, for Jenkins’ purposes, Rehnquist’s essential self, his
true self, is at once personal and public. The two are intertwined. The
key to understanding the public man is to understand the private
man. As a justice, Rehnquist was a jurisprudential “nihilist,” in that
he did not respect legal rules and institutions, but the roots of this
nihilism, according to Jenkins, are found ingrained in his personality.
He did not care about others—not about what they thought, not
about their struggles. The personal becomes a window into
Rehnquist’s essential legal commitments; the legal becomes a
window into his essential personal commitments. We behold the
biographer’s creation of a coherent, unitary subject.
43. JOHN LEWIS
THE PAST 124 (2002).

GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: HOW HISTORIANS MAP
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This essentializing move allows Jenkins to basically read law
out of his biography. Rehnquist was “an expedient conservative”
(p. xv). He was “on a partisan’s mission” (p. xv). By defining his
subject as such a thoroughgoing realist—indeed, a legal
“nihilist”—Jenkins’ Rehnquist is driven solely by politics,
ideology, even “instinct” (pp. xiv, xv). The evidence Jenkins
supplies for this characterization is thin, at best. Rehnquist, in a
letter to his son, described “stare decisis” in the context of
constitutional law as “pretty much of a sham” (p. 250). And in an
interview he described his approach to judging as involving
looking at both sides of a case and trying to determine which side
had “the better point of view”—a seemingly innocuous statement
that Jenkins returns to over and over again as a kind of smoking
gun of Rehnquist’s lawless, results-oriented decision making
process (pp. 246, 248, 249).
By demoting, even dismissing law, and elevating instinctive
partisanship in its place, Jenkins sets the stage for a judicial
44
biography largely void of legal analysis. To write a biography
of a jurist that focuses on issues other than his or her professional
work product is, of course, perfectly defensible. Such a book
would be a biography of a judicial figure, if not a judicial
biography. But The Partisan tries to have it both ways. While deemphasizing law and disclaiming to offer any kind of a
“comprehensive survey of Rehnquist’s jurisprudence” (pp. xix–
xx), Jenkins’ entire book centers on Rehnquist’s life in the law.
“Rehnquist was a brilliant loner who used the Court to advance
his right-wing agenda,” Jenkins writes, in what could very well
serve as the biography’s thesis statement (p. xiv). Although there
is a good deal of information in this book about Rehnquist’s life
beyond his opinions, this is hardly a serious study of the private
man. For behind the public face, what Jenkins purports to
discover is not a hidden private side, but a somewhat more
sinister (“brooding”) version of the public face. So the
Rehnquist everyone knew, i.e., the ideological conservative, was,
in fact, under the surface, an ideological conservative. The point
44. Perhaps the reader should be thankful for this. When Jenkins does touch upon
matters of legal doctrine, he is prone to errors, some quite glaring. For instance, he
describes Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2000), an Establishment Clause case, as the case
that signaled the demise of the “federalism revolution” (p. 249). He also mangles an effort
to describe the influence of Charles Fairman, Rehnquist’s professor at Stanford. He
somehow links Fairman’s views on the Fourteenth Amendment’s “incorporation” of the
Bill of Rights to (a) Rehnquist’s opposition to Brown; (b) his dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); and (c) his majority opinion in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (pp. 16, 37, 143).
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in this unenlightening exercise is to do more than to illuminate
the private Rehnquist. It is to illuminate the real, true, and
essential Rehnquist, a coherent being whose public and private
life was of a piece. In the end, this book seeks to demonstrate
how Rehnquist used the law and the highest legal institution in
the land to advance his agenda, but to do so without seriously
engaging with the law. This is an enterprise destined, on its own
terms, to come up short.
Jenkins has still another simplifying move to make. Not only
does he write law out of Rehnquist’s story, but he also defines
his subject as basically unchanging in his basic views. In Jenkins’
telling, the reactionary’s ideas were etched in stone from the
beginning. His upbringing in a comfortable Republican
household in a suburb of Milwaukee (“a homogenous idyll of
lakefront mansions and well-tended bungalows” (p. xviii)) made
him a right-wing ideologue; his life thereafter was just a matter
of locating ways to express his beliefs. His three-plus decades on
the Supreme Court were exceptional in that he changed not a
whit. Rehnquist offers “a unique case study,” Jenkins explains,
in that he was “flash frozen from the day he arrived” on the
Court (p. xvii).
D. THE PROBLEM WITH ESSENTIALIZING
The basic problem with all this essentializing, all this
“unmasking,” is that it is so out of line with some basic facts about
Rehnquist. In this section I consider two facets of Rehnquist’s life
that have puzzled observers, but that Jenkins’ biography does
nothing to illuminate. Indeed, he basically denies they are issues
at all. They are: (1) Rehnquist’s close personal relations with his
colleagues; and (2) his apparent shift of position toward the end
of his life on several major constitutional questions.
1. Personality
It is difficult to square Jenkins’ harsh assessment of Rehnquist the
man with his record of close friendships with his fellow Justices. As
David Garrow wrote in a 1996 profile, “his colleagues were
unanimously pleased and supportive” when Rehnquist was being
considered for the Chief Justiceship. A lawyer who interviewed
people in the Court found the prospect of Rehnquist’s elevation was
met with “genuine enthusiasm on the part of not only his colleagues
on the Court but others who served the Court in a staff capacity and
some of the relatively lowly paid individuals at the Court. There was
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almost a unanimous feeling of joy.”45 Even his ideological opponents
seemed to like him on an personal level. According to Garrow, Justice
William J. Brennan once privately described Rehnquist as “my best
46
friend up here.” Jenkins gives the reader no insight into why so many
people—including those who passionately disagreed with Rehnquist’s
legal and political commitments—liked the man. The best he can do
is to suggest that Rehnquist was a great dissembler—a fake, basically.
(“But behind the façade lurked a different person” (p. 163).)
Jenkins’ portrait of Rehnquist as harsh and unyielding in all walks
of life simply does not add up. His colleagues consistently praised his
leadership skills. Unlike his predecessor, Chief Justice Warren Burger,
who was notorious both for his officiousness and the rambling Justices’
conferences he led, Rehnquist stood out for, in Justice Stevens’
assessment, his ability to handle the responsibilities of the Chief
47
Justice “competently and impartially.” On the part of his law clerks,
48
Rehnquist evoked a sense of real affection.
Rehnquist could be quite compassionate to those around
him. He had an irreverent sense of humor, a low-key demeanor,
and, for all the confidence with which he espoused his views, a
personal self-deprecation rare for someone with his
achievements. To be sure, he could be harsh and uncompromising;
his humor often struck a juvenile chord and it could be callous;
and much of his political work prior to becoming a judge and a
good deal of his work on the bench evidences a shortage of basic
sensitivity for the condition of the disempowered and
downtrodden in society. But Jenkins never makes anything close
to a persuasive case for why his less admirable qualities should be
understood as the truth of the man, while everything else nothing
more than a cynical “mask.” People are contradictory and
complicated. A better biographer would have recognized the
contradictions and complications of Rehnquist’s life story as an
opportunity.
2. Change
Another significant aspect of Rehnquist’s biography that
Jenkins fails to confront is the apparent shift, toward the end
45. David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 6, 1996, at 67.
46. Id.
47. STEVENS, supra note 37, at 170.
48. See, e.g., the Maureen Mahoney interview in T HE SUPREME COURT: A CSPAN BOOK F EATURING THE J USTICES IN THEIR O WN WORDS 288-89 (Brian Lamb
et al. eds., 2010); James E. Ryan, The Chief as Teacher, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1687 (2006).
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of his time on the Court, in his positions on certain
constitutional issues. If the central theme of Rehnquist’s tenure
as an Associate Justice (1972-86) was his robust, often lonely
conservatism (his clerks nicknamed him the “Lone Ranger” for
his frequent solo dissents), the central theme of his tenure as
Chief Justice (1986-2005) was something else. There was no
transformation, to be sure, but there were signs of evolution, a
new sensibility about his role on the Court that had something
to do with his position as Chief Justice and something to do
with his own reconsideration of the merits of certain
constitutional positions he had previously staked out.
Rehnquist’s sense of institutional responsibility to the Court
became more evident. He showed less interest in expounding
and defending his conservative jurisprudence. His written
opinions, never particularly discursive, turned terse and
49
workmanlike—”dry and to the point,” as one journalist put it.
And, contrary to Jenkins’ relentless “partisan” thesis,
Rehnquist did appear to moderate, to some extent, from the
unyielding conservative jurisprudence that had defined his
public life to that point.
What happened? Jenkins offers little guidance here because
he basically tries to deny that anything happened at all. In some
instances he does this by just ignoring decisions that fail to
conform to his portrait of Rehnquist. Thus the landmark 1996 sex
50
discrimination case involving the Virginia Military Institute gets
nary a mention, even though Rehnquist, a longtime critic of the
51
Court’s sex discrimination doctrine, joined the majority in this
52
one (while his usual ally, Justice Scalia, wrote one of his
53
trademark scorched-earth dissents ).
In other instances, Jenkins makes cursory efforts to explain
away decisions that do not fit his “flash frozen” Rehnquist.
54
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003) was a
6-3 decision in which Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court,
49. Garrow, supra note 45, at 70.
50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
51. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see generally
Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1874-81 (2006) (describing Rehnquist’s
opposition to the ERA prior to appointment to the Court and resistance to heightened
scrutiny for sex discrimination once on the Court).
52. 518 U.S. at 558–66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
53. Id. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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upholding congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to require state governments to apply the Family
and Medical Leave Act to its employees. Rehnquist’s decision has
been something of a puzzler for scholars. Reva Siegel wrote an
article on Rehnquist and Hibbs titled You’ve Come a Long Way,
55
Baby. The favored explanation for this surprising development
attributes Rehnquist’s evolution on the issue of pregnancy
discrimination to his personal life. Following his wife’s death in
1991, he took on more grandparenting responsibility, including
helping to take care of the child of one of his daughters, a single
mom working as a lawyer. Rehnquist’s opinion in Hibbs was
56
“such a delightful surprise,” recalled Justice Ginsburg.
When my husband read it, he asked, did I write that opinion? I
was very fond of my old chief. I have a sense that it was in part
his life experience. When his daughter Janet was divorced, I
think the chief felt some kind of responsibility to be kind of a
father figure to those girls. So he became more sensitive to
57
things that he might not have noticed.

In order to explain Hibbs, Jenkins offers a new twist in his
assessment of Rehnquist—a twist that has the inconvenience of
undermining the central thesis of his biography. Rehnquist, the
unwavering conservative ideologue, the reactionary, is actually,
Jenkins claims in the closing pages of the book, an adherent of
“pragmatic conservatism” (p. 246). Because he doesn’t care about
law, but because he does care about his daughter, who is a single
mother, the decision is perfectly explainable.
But wait—Hibbs, we now learn, “wasn’t the only time that
Rehnquist confounded the conservative pundits” (p. 246). (The
predictable ideologue has suddenly become much more
58
interesting.) There was also the 2000 case in which Rehnquist, a
59
long-time critic of Miranda v. Arizona, wrote an opinion which
declared that the Miranda warnings “have become part of our
60
national culture,” and struck down a 1968 federal law in which
Congress had sought to statutorily overturn the controversial 1966
decision.
55. Siegel, supra note 51.
56. Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. T IMES MAG ., July
12, 2009, at 46.
57. Id.; see also Cary Franklin, Justice Ginsburg’s Advocacy and the Future of Equal
Protection, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 227, 233 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/02/21/
franklin.html (remarks of Justice Ginsburg).
58. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. 530 U.S. at 443.
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What happened here? Jenkins does not really have an
explanation. Rehnquist was a “situationalist” (p. 246), meaning
that he was moved by instinct, and here his gut steered him to
change course. Others have provided more useful efforts at
explanation. Justice Scalia assumed, plausibly, it has something to
do with the institutional responsibilities of the Chief Justiceship.
As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist “was a shin kicker. He was
61
very, very opinionated. He changed when he became chief.”
Additional evidence might be drawn from Rehnquist’s own
extrajudicial writings, which were quite extensive and, prior to his
elevation to Chief Justice, often quite probing and self-reflective
on the role of the judge in a constitutional democracy. A
particularly notable theme in the various lectures he delivered in
the 1970s and 1980s was the impact of public opinion on the
Supreme Court—a fact he saw as both inevitable and, to an
62
extent, desirable.
Although there is much room for debate regarding the nature
and extent of Rehnquist’s change, that something happened here
is indisputable. Regardless of how one characterizes these cases,
they raise one of the great questions about Rehnquist the man and
the jurist—a question that screams out for some sort of insight by
a biographer. Jenkins does not even go so far as to identify this as
a question. The Rehnquist he has created for the reader could not
change, therefore he did not change, therefore there is no puzzle
to be explored.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the heart of the challenge of writing any biography is the
need to create a coherent, unitary whole out of a subject’s life,
uniting the personal with the public. The standard contribution of
the judicial biographer is to probe behind the official
pronouncements of the subject, unearthing their deeper meaning
by linking jurisprudence with personality and character. A
Justice’s written opinions are transformed into a reflection of
something deeper. They become lenses into an inner self. This
61. Quoted in Terry Baynes, Fanning furor, Justice Scalia says appeals court judge
lied, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2012. Prior to his elevation, Rehnquist wrote that the Chief Justice
“must be not only a jurist, but interlocutor of the judicial minstrel show, a planner, and
occasionally a statesman. Surely training in the rough and tumble of politics is no hindrance
to the performance of these tasks.” William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 639 (1976).
62. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court,
2 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 320 (1985); Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 697.
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kind of scholarship can be illuminating. But it is also fraught with
risks—as demonstrated in Jenkins’ relentless, ultimately
flattening effort to “unmask” Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Jenkins writes that “Rehnquist often appeared to be living in
a private world of his own invention” (p. xvi). Perhaps. Perhaps
this might be said of us all. What is unquestionable, though, is that
the Rehnquist of this partisan biography is one largely of the
author’s own creation. He is not a fair representation of what we
know about Rehnquist simply by virtue of his public record. He is
not even an interesting or fully realized character—he fails as a
product of biographical reconstruction. He is the unfortunate
projection of a writer who disagrees with his subject’s legal and
political views and who also took a visceral disliking to his subject
on a personal level.
The Partisan is a failure as a work of biography. But it fails in
some rather interesting ways. The book raises, if often
inadvertently, important questions about Rehnquist and his
legacy, as well as the general challenge of writing a biography of
a modern Supreme Court Justice.

